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I. INTRODUCTION 
The specter of political corruption has loomed over democracy since its 
inception in Ancient Athens.1 To prevent corruption, political reform in Athens 
 
1. See John Camp, Ostracized in Athens: Ancient Greeks Knew How to Dump Bad Pols, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 
24, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/24/opinion/24iht-edcamp_ed3_html (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (describing the Athenian practice of ostracizing politicians who threatened the democracy). 
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took a simpler form than it does today.2 The people would first vote on whether 
they felt there was a person that posed a threat to democracy.3 If the people 
decided that there was, then every citizen of Athens voted for the person they 
perceived as the greatest threat.4 The Athenian that received the most votes was 
then exiled from Athens for a decade.5 The process was called ostracism, named 
for the ostracon, or shards of pottery, on which Athenians would write the name 
of the man he deemed worthy of exile.6 It is an institution that California 
lawmakers may have wished was still available to them following the indictment 
of three California Senators in 2014.7 
While California has traditionally eschewed the practice of ostracism, the 
state has proactively regulated politics, with the most prominent example being 
the Political Reform Act of 1974.8 However, the indictment of three of their own 
spurred California lawmakers to realize that California needed new regulations.9 
The importance of the moment was not lost on Senator Darrel Steinberg, who 
declared that “[s]ometimes it takes a crisis” to pass new ethics reform bills.10 
Among the pieces of legislation spawned by this crisis was SB 831, which 
addressed gifts of travel to legislators, behested11 payments to nonprofit 
organizations, and campaign fund expenditures, each of which played a role in 
the Senatorial indictments that began the process.12 
Part II of this Article will address the legal history of political reform efforts 
in California. Part III will discuss the proposed effects of SB 831. Part IV will 
analyze what the impact of SB 831 would have been on California. 
 





7. See Norimitsu Onishi, California Democrats Await Fallout After 3 Are Caught Up in Scandals, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/us/california-democrats-await-fallout-after-3-are-
caught-up-in-scandals.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the indictments of the 
California Senators). 
8. See About the Political Reform Act, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca. 
gov/index.php?id=221 (last visited June 18, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the 
Political Reform Act). 
9. Jessica Calefati, Support Wanes in Sacramento for Tough Ethics Reform Following Scandal, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS, July 6, 2014, http://www.mercurynews.com/california/ci_26095376/support-wanes-tough-
ethics-reform-following-scandal (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
10. Id. 
11. Senate Bill 831 does not define “behested,” but Merriam-Webster defines “behest” as “an 
authoritative order” or “an urgent prompting.” Behest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/behest?show=0&t=1417208066, (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
12. SB 831 §§ 1(a), 3(a), 8(a) 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 9, 2014, but not enacted); 
see Patrick McGreevy, Nonprofits Tied to Legislators Collect Cash out of Public View, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2013, 
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-legislature-nonprofits-20131117-story.html#axzz2kwqVHG7x&page=1 (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing Senator Calderon’s use of his brother’s nonprofit to hide contributions 
from special interest groups). 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This section will first address the history of political reform in California 
prior to the Political Reform Act of 1974 (PRA). It will then discuss the PRA in 
general and describe the areas of law affected by SB 831 in greater depth. 
A. The History of Political Reform in California 
Regulating the conduct of politicians and the multitude of special interests 
surrounding them has been an area of concern for the California legislature for 
over half a century; the legislature has passed over eighty distinct statutes in an 
ongoing effort to police itself.13 Efforts to consolidate the various regulations into 
a more comprehensive piece of legislation began in 1969 with an overbroad 
disclosure statute that the California Supreme Court deemed unconstitutionally 
restrictive in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young in 197014 and continued with 
the Moscone Governmental Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure Act (Moscone 
Act) in 1973.15 The Moscone Act, while not found unconstitutional, was 
subsumed by the PRA just a year after its passage.16 
B. The Political Reform Act of 1974 
A landmark piece of political legislation was passed in 1974 when voters 
approved Proposition 9 by a large majority.17 “The [PRA] was . . . 
comprehensive, covering all areas of political reform.”18 In addition, the PRA 
created the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and empowered it both to 
enforce the title’s provisions and to create new regulations in order to further the 
PRA’s goals.19 
1. What is a Contribution Under the PRA? 
Section 82015 of the California Government Code, enacted by the PRA, 
defines the types of payments that qualify as contributions.20 The statute defines a 
contribution as “a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a 
 
13. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 262, 466 P.2d 225, 227 (1970). 
14. 2 Cal. 3d at 272, 466 P.2d 235. 
15. Jeri McKeand, The Political Reform Act of 1974: A Critical Look at Conflict of Interest and 
Disclosure Requirements, 5 W. ST. U. L. REV. 269, 269–70 (1978). 
16. Id. at 270. 
17. About the Political Reform Act, supra note 8. 
18. McKeand, supra note 15, at 271 (“Besides the conflict of interest and disclosure provisions, the Act 
regulates Campaign Disclosures, Lobbyists, Ballot Pamphlets, Incumbency, Auditing of Statements, 
Enforcement, and sets up the Fair Political Practices Commission to administer the Act.”) (citations omitted). 
19. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100, 83111, 83112 (West 2005). 
20. Id. § 82015. 
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third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment except to the extent 
that full and adequate consideration is received, unless it is clear from the 
surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political purposes.”21 The 
section goes on to specify that any payment of this kind made “at the behest” of a 
committee or candidate also qualifies as a contribution.22 The statute lists specific 
circumstances in which payments are “unrelated” to political purposes and 
includes payments made by nonprofit organizations.23 Thus, under section 82015, 
payments made by nonprofit organizations, even when at the behest of a 
candidate or elected officer, are not contributions.24 
Contributions are a small part of a broader concern about lobbying that was a 
major motivation for passing the PRA.25 The desire for stricter and broader 
regulation over lobbying activities likely contributed to the overwhelming 
passage of Proposition 9 in 1974.26 Inhibiting lobbying activities perceived as 
improper was the driving force behind the PRA.27 
2. How Does the PRA Treat Gifts of Travel? 
California Government Code section 89506 deals with payments made for 
travel expenses that are “reasonably related to a legislative or governmental 
purpose.”28 The statute lays out two exceptions to the normal limitations placed 
on gifts by Government Code section 89503.29 The first exception is narrowly 
restricted to payment of travel expenses incurred for speeches given by 
candidates and elected officials.30 The second, however, is much broader: it 
provides that travel payments made by “a government, a governmental agency, a 
foreign government, a governmental authority, a bona fide public or private 
educational institution, . . . [or] a nonprofit organization” are not subject to 
normal gift limitations.31 This exception was created to allow charitable and 
educational entities to pay public officials to speak at their events.32 However, in 
 
21. Id. § 82015(a). 
22. Id. § 82015(b). 
23. Id. § 82015(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
24. Id. 
25. See Stephen Landuyt, Disclosure and Individual Rights: Influencing the Legislative Process Under 
the Political Form Act of 1974, 8 PAC. L.J. 939, 955–56 (1977) (“By passing the Political Reform Act of 1974, 
the people of California expressed their desire to have stricter controls and additional disclosure requirements 
placed on lobbying activities to inhibit and uncover improper influences directed at the legislative process.”). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. GOV’T § 89506(a). 
29. Id. § 89506. 
30. Id. § 89506(a)(1). 
31. Id. § 89506(a)(2). 
32. PHILLIP UNG, CAL. COMMON CAUSE, GIFTS, INFLUENCE, AND POWER: A REPORT ON GIFTS GIVEN TO 
CALIFORNIA’S ELECTED OFFICIALS 9 (2013), available at http://www.commoncause.org/research-reports/CA_ 
122013_Report_Gifts_Given_to_California-s_Elected_Officials_1.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). 
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2013 nonprofit organizations used the loophole to reimburse public officials for 
over $500,000 in travel payments.33 Concerns about gifts, including those 
disguised as travel expenses, were reflected in the PRA.34 Indeed, some 
academics expressed concerns that interest groups would use these types of gifts 
to unduly influence legislators.35 
3. How Does the PRA Treat Charitable Donations? 
Section 89515 of the California Government Code declares that the donation 
of campaign funds to “bona fide charitable, educational, civic, religious, or 
similar tax-exempt nonprofit organizations” is permissible, provided that “no 
substantial part” of the donation will confer a financial benefit on “the candidate, 
elected officer, campaign treasurer, or any individual or individuals with 
authority to approve the expenditure of campaign funds held by a committee, or 
member of his or her immediate family.”36 It also requires that the donation 
“bear[] a reasonable relation to a political, legislative, or governmental 
purpose.”37 The statute provides no definition of what constitutes a financial 
benefit, nor does it provide any clarity on what it means by a “substantial part of 
the proceeds.”38 However, FPPC regulations state that a “financial effect” is 
material “if it is at least $250 in any 12-month period.”39 Large donations to the 
favorite charities of politicians are exempt from regulation as long as the 
donation confers no direct material benefit on the public official or his family.40 
However, the growing prevalence of these donations suggests a new trend.41 Gifts 
to legislators, whether directly or indirectly, were a major concern to legal 
commentators during the passage of the PRA.42 
4. What Types of Campaign Fund Expenditures Does the PRA Restrict? 
California Government Code Section 89513 prohibits specific types of 
campaign fund expenditures.43 The beginning of the statute deals directly with 
 
33. Jeremy B. White, California Lawmakers Enjoyed $550,000 Worth of Paid Travel in 2013, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 4, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/03/04/6209174/ california-lawmakers-enjoyed-
550000.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
34. See Landuyt, supra note 25, at 945–46 (discussing concerns about direct and indirect gifts). 
35. See id. at 955–56 (noting wariness about undue influence being exerted on legislators). 
36. Id. § 89515. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18705.5 (2014). 
40. GOV’T §89515. 
41. See Anthony York, Jerry Brown’s Charter Schools in Oakland Reap Big Donations, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 8, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/aug/08/local/la-me-brown-charities-20110808 (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review) (noting the increasing popularity of such donations). 
42. Landuyt, supra note 25, at 955–56. 
43. GOV’T § 89513. 
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travel expenses incurred by candidates, their staff members, and their families.44 
It specifies that campaign funds may not be used to pay or reimburse a candidate 
or staffer for travel expenses unless those expenses are “directly related to a 
political, legislative, or governmental purpose”45 and provides that the standard 
for determining whether travel expenses are sufficiently related will be similar to 
the federal income tax law standards.46 
In addition to regulating travel expenditures, this section of the PRA also 
prohibits a number of other specific expenditures of campaign funds.47 Section 
89513 prohibits the use of campaign funds to pay for professional services,48 
health-related expenses (including medical appointments and health club dues),49 
or clothing for the candidate (unless it is “specialty clothing . . . not suitable for 
everyday use . . . [that] is directly related to a political, legislative, or 
governmental purpose”).50  
The PRA also regulates the use of campaign funds on vehicles.51 Government 
Code section 89516 outlines two requirements for the permissible purchase or 
lease of a vehicle with campaign funds.52 The first requirement mandates that title 
to the vehicle be held by the committee, rather than by the “candidate, elected 
officer, campaign treasurer, or any other individual or individuals with authority 
to approve the expenditure of campaign funds held by a committee, or a member 
of his or her immediate family.”53 The second requires that the vehicle’s use 
“directly relate[] to a political, legislative, or governmental purpose.”54 
California Government Code section 89517 governs the use of campaign 
funds for the purchase and lease of real property.55 It completely bans the use of 
campaign funds to purchase real property.56 However, it permits the use of 
campaign funds for the lease of real property, as well as the lease and 
refurbishment of appliances so long as the lessor or sublessor is not “a candidate, 
elected officer, campaign treasurer, or any individual or individuals with 
authority to approve the expenditure of campaign funds, or member of his or her 
immediate family” and the property or appliance is “directly related to a political, 
 
44. Id. § 89513(a). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. § 89513(a)(1). 
47. Id. § 89513(b)–(g). 
48. Id. § 89513(b)(1). 
49. Id. § 89513(b)(2 ). 
50. Id. § 89513(d). 
51. Id. § 89516. 
52. Id. § 89516 (a). 
53. Id. § 89516(a)(1). 
54. Id. § 89516(a)(2). 
55. Id. § 89517. 
56. Id. § 89517(b). 
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legislative, or governmental purpose” such that any other use is “only incidental” 
to that purpose.57 
III. SB 831 
SB 831 would have changed campaign finance rules regarding gifts of 
travel,58 behested donations to nonprofit organizations,59 and expenditures of 
campaign funds.60 All restrictions placed on nonprofit organizations by SB 831 
would have applied only to 501(c)(4) organizations.61 
A. Travel-Related Gifts 
SB 831 would have increased disclosure from nonprofit organizations when 
they give gifts of travel.62 The bill would have required these groups to disclose 
the names of all donors who “knew or had reason to know that the donation 
would be used for a payment, advance, or reimbursement for travel.”63 These 
rules would only have applied to groups who provide more than $10,000 of total 
travel donations in a single year or who give more than $5,000 in gifts of travel 
to a single individual.64 
B. Behested Donations to Nonprofits 
SB 831 outlines new restrictions regarding the solicitation of payments to 
nonprofit organizations owned or controlled by the elected officer, any other 
elected officer serving on the same elective body, or a family member of any 
elected officer on that body.65 SB 831 would have prohibited making these 
behested payments to nonprofit organizations “owned or controlled” by a public 
official or a member of his family.”66 This prohibition would have stopped these 
types of donations from being exempted from normal restrictions on campaign 
contributions.67 It also would have prohibited elected officers from soliciting 
 
57. Id. § 89517. 
58. SB 831 § 3(a), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted). 
59. Id. at § 1(a). 
60. Id. at § 4. 
61. Id. at § 1(a). 
62. Id. at § 3(a). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at § 6. 
66. Id. at § 1(a). 
67. Id. at § 6. 
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these payments to charities from nonprofit organizations.68 The only nonprofit 
groups to which these restrictions would have applied are 501(c)(4) groups.69 
C.  Limits on the Use of Campaign Funds 
Senate Bill 831 would have required that the use of any vehicle purchased 
with campaign funds be “related to an election campaign,”70 a subtle change from 
the previous requirement that it be “related to a political, legislative, or 
governmental purpose.”71 It also would have forbade the use of campaign funds 
to make payments for personal vacations for candidates, elected officers, and 
their employees.72 In addition, SB 831 sought to prohibit the use of campaign 
funds to purchase or lease real property or appliances when the lessee or owner 
of the item in question is a candidate, elected officer, or another individual 
authorized to approve campaign spending.73 Along the same lines, campaign 
funds would no longer have been allowed to be used to pay membership dues at 
any kind of recreational facility, including country clubs or health clubs, or to 
pay tuition.74 SB 831 also would have disallowed the use of campaign funds for 
any clothing for a candidate or elected officer.75 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This section discusses the benefits and potential insufficiencies contributing 
to the hypothetical impact of the passage of SB 831.76 Part A considers the 
proposed restrictions and disclosure requirements for gifts of travel expenses. 
Part B examines the proposed changes to donations to nonprofits at the behest of 
an elected official. Part C explores the proposed restrictions on the use of 
campaign funds for what might be considered personal expenses of a candidate 
or elected official. Finally, Part D discusses competing rationale for Governor 
Brown’s veto of SB 831. 
 
68. Id. at § 1(a). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at § 7. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at § 4. 
73. Id. at § 8. 
74. Id. at § 4. 
75. Id. 
76. See UNG, supra note 32 (discussing loopholes in the PRA that have been used by politicians); see also 
Calefati, supra note 9 (discussing the aims and potential failings of SB 831). 
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A. Gifts of Travel 
One of the primary foci of SB 831 centers on gifts of travel.77 These gifts, 
when made by educational institutions or nonprofit organizations are not subject 
to normal gift restrictions.78 In other words, after the veto of SB 831, nonprofit 
organizations can still subsidize unlimited travel costs for public officials and 
avoid the limitations ordinarily placed on campaign contributions.79 Watchdog 
groups like Common Cause have viewed gifts of travel as a potentially 
underhanded way for organizations to curry favor with politicians outside the 
confines of political regulation.80 
The Sacramento Bee reported that in 2013, politicians in California received 
over $550,000 in free travel.81 That number represents a significant increase from 
the 2012 level of $329,000.82 According to the study, these trips were funded by a 
variety of sources, including “foreign governments, foundations fueled by 
corporate and labor money[,] and nonprofits tied to specific industries.”83 The 
trips included excursions to countries including Switzerland, Taiwan, and Israel.84 
Multiple lawmakers received over $30,000 in gifts of travel.85 
While these isolated numbers may seem troubling, Robert Stern, a co-author 
of the PRA, has said that “[t]here is no inherent issue with [Legislators] 
travel[ing]. . . .”86 Lawmakers can benefit in a variety of ways from seeing how 
other governments function.87 However, the underlying concern is that special 
interests use these unlimited gifts of travel to garner undue influence over the 
legislators whose excursions they subsidize.88 According to Common Cause, 
many special interests use, or even establish, nonprofit organizations for the 
specific purpose of exploiting the travel exception to normal political gift limits.89 
The report states that while the purpose of the loophole is to allow public 
officials to speak at legitimate philanthropic events, the reality is that the 
exception may afford special interests an opportunity to influence California 
lawmakers.90 
 
77. SB 831 § 3, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. UNG, supra note 32, at 13. 







88. See UNG, supra note 32, at 9 (describing how “a number of special interest groups take advantage of 
the travel loophole by setting up or using non-profits” to skirt the $440 gift limit). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. (“The purpose of this non-profit travel exemption was to allow 501(c)(3) charities providing 
public services or philanthropy to invite officials to speak. The reality is the exact opposite.”). 
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One major trip reported by the Los Angeles Times was a conference in Maui 
attended by a number of California legislators.91 This annual Maui retreat is 
sponsored by nonprofit organizations that are funded by interest groups including 
the cigarette maker Altria, Southern California Edison, a pharmaceutical 
manufacturing association, and the California Beer and Beverage Distributors.92 
One of the event’s organizers said that the event was held to “give[] the 
sponsoring companies an opportunity to talk about what their business is like in 
California.”93 While these trips may create the appearance of impropriety, it is 
important to remember that they serve valuable purposes for legislators.94 
Despite concern regarding these travel gifts,95 SB 831 stopped short of 
banning or even limiting these gifts of travel.96 Instead, it would have only 
imposed disclosure requirements.97 SB 831 would have required that nonprofits 
and other organizations that subsidize travel over a certain amount disclose not 
just the gift, but the specific donors who knew or had reason to know about it as 
well.98 
Senator Jerry Hill, the sponsor of SB 831, stated that this would further the 
goal of “increas[ing] the transparency of these travel-related gifts.”99 Indeed, 
requiring these nonprofits to disclose the names of the donors who made the 
travel gifts possible would reveal the types of special interests that Common 
Cause suggests are using nonprofit groups as a shield behind which they can 
donate to politicians anonymously.100 The Supreme Court has made the state’s 
interest in requiring political disclosure clear by indicating that disclosure is 
critically important to help voters better grasp the political beliefs and intentions 
of candidates.101 In Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the court 
held that allowing donors to avoid disclosure was not necessary in order to 
protect free speech and noted the importance of transparency in helping citizens 
“make informed choices in the political marketplace.”102 
Robert Stern, a co-author of the original Political Reform Act, addressed the 
same concern in the context of gifts of travel, stating that he had “a problem with 
 
91. Patrick McGreevy, California Lawmakers Head to Maui for Annual Retreats, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-lawmakers-head-to-maui-for-annual-retreats-
20131108-story.html#axzz2mA2uiUF7 [hereinafter Maui] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. See White, supra note 33 (discussing the value of legislative travel). 
95. Id. 
96. SB 831 § 3, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Maui, supra note 91. 
100. See UNG, supra note 32, at 9 (describing the special-interest group practice of setting up 501(c)(3)s 
for the purpose of exploiting the travel-expense loophole). 
101. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010). 
102. Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003), overruled by Citizens 
United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)). 
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the travel in the sense of it’s not disclosed where money is coming from . . . .”103 
However, there is a sense that the failure to provide any actual limitation on these 
payments represents a failure on the part of the legislation and that it is “watered-
down.”104 As originally written, the bill would have instituted a $7,000 limit on 
gifts of travel from a single source.105 However, that provision was removed as 
SB 831 underwent the inevitable trimming of the legislative process.106 Some 
commentators suggested that with the passage of time since political scandal 
rocked California early in 2014, support for giving real teeth to political reform 
has ebbed significantly.107 This diminished legislative ardor has allowed 
amendments limiting the reach of SB 831 to take effect.108 
Despite these concerns, there are indications that the bill’s lack of a 
limitation on the amount of gifts of travel that politicians can accept represents a 
compromise of legitimate interests as opposed to a waning desire to implement 
real reform.109 Legislative travel, as mentioned earlier, does serve a legitimate 
purpose and has real value to both the legislators themselves and the constituency 
they serve.110 The travel costs can be significant, however, and various 
commentators have at times expressed outrage over the supposed waste of 
taxpayer dollars used to subsidize traveling politicians, including, most 
prominently, the President of the United States.111 While there are valid concerns 
regarding the subsidization of legislative travel by interest groups, one author 
from Watchdog Wire noted that these gifts of travel prevent taxpayers from 
having to provide funding for legitimate travel-related expenses incurred by 
California lawmakers.112 
With the travel donations to legislators rising dramatically between 2012 and 
2013, the sentiment that somewhere amongst the vast needs of the state may lay a 
 
103. White, supra note 33. While Stern agreed that lack of disclosure surrounding gifts of travel were part 
of the problem, he advocated going farther and requiring the state to pay for the travel expenses rather than 
simply increasing disclosure requirements. Id. 
104. Patrick McGreevy, Calif. Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards, Rejects Others, L.A.TIMES, June 9, 2014, 
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-calif-senate-adopts-new-ethics-standards-20140609-story.html 
[hereinafter Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Calefati, supra note 9. 
108. Id. 
109. See id. (indicating that amendments by the Appropriations Committee are typically made when a bill 
would be unworkable or too costly to implement). 
110. White, supra note 33. 
111. See, e.g., Obama’s Pricey Vacations: Air Force One Operating Cost for 3 Trips. . . A Whopping $16 
Million, GLENN BECK, Mar. 28, 2014, http://www.glennbeck.com/2014/03/28/obamas-pricey-vacations-air-
force-one-operating-cost-for-3-trips-a-whopping-16-million/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(criticizing the cost of President Obama’s recent trips to Africa and Honolulu). 
112. Josh Kaib, California Lawmakers Travel on Special Interest Groups’ Dime, Rack Up $550,000 Bill, 
WATCHDOGWIRE, Mar. 5, 2014, http://watchdogwire.com/California/2014/03/05/California-lawmakers-travel-
on-special-interest-groups-dime-rack-up-550000-bill/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
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nobler purpose for taxpayer dollars appears tenable.113 Still, the sponsor of the 
legislation, Senator Hill, indicated his displeasure with the softening of travel gift 
restrictions in SB 831, saying that “[w]hat works for the committee may not 
work for you, but if you want the bill to move forward, that’s how it goes.”114 
Senator Kevin de León is the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
which is the group responsible for the changes made to SB 831.115 Senator De 
León’s Chief of Staff described the changes as “improvements” to the bill that 
would make it “more workable.”116 SB 831 would have represented a 
compromise: allowing the donations that make legislative travel possible,117 while 
preventing special-interests groups from hiding behind a shield of anonymity.118  
B. Donations to Nonprofits 
While the PRA revolutionized political regulation in California in an 
unprecedentedly broad manner, the decades that followed revealed a need for 
additional legislation.119 As part of a broader package of legislation relating to 
ethics, SB 831 sought to further the underlying purposes of the PRA.120 One of 
the concerns SB 831 would have addressed is the substantial flow of money 
donated to nonprofit organizations at the behest of California politicians.121 These 
payments are legal and monitored by the FPPC.122 
However, some observers have suggested that donations to the favorite 
charities of various elected officials by lobbyists and special-interest groups 
could have the effect of currying favor with those officials while evading 
traditional campaign finance regulation.123 A Common Cause report estimates 
that public officials in California have solicited $105.5 million for a multitude of 
projects or charities since 2000, including a record $33 million in 2008.124 Phillip 
Ung, a Common Cause spokesperson, stated unequivocally in an interview with 
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Capitol Weekly that “absolutely there is a hidden motive” and suggested that 
companies often “use behested payments to get a favor.”125 
Given the events preceding SB 831, this concern makes sense.126 Senator 
Ronald Calderon, one of the California Senators whose indictment preceded the 
drafting of SB 831, used these behested payments to conceal bribes from film 
executives.127 Calderon “accepted $60,000 from an undercover FBI operative 
masquerading as a film executive.”128 $25,000 of that bribe was to be hidden as a 
donation to a nonprofit owned by his brother, Tom Calderon.129 These types of 
transactions are exactly what SB 831 would have addressed, prohibiting 
payments to nonprofit organizations run by elected officials or their family 
members, such as the one operated by Senator Calderon’s brother.130 
While most behested payments to nonprofit groups will not have the criminal 
character of those made on behalf of Senator Calderon, the idea of unlimited 
payments acting as pseudo-contributions from special interest groups to public 
officials and evading the traditional restrictions placed upon political 
contributions is troubling to political watchdog groups like Common Cause.131 At 
the top of the list of politicians who have solicited charitable donations from 
special interests without facing an indictment is the governor of California, Jerry 
Brown.132 According to a Common Cause study, Brown has accumulated $3.5 
million in behested payments since taking office in 2010.133 These payments 
consisted primarily of charitable contributions to a pair of charter schools 
founded by Brown in the Bay Area,134 and the largest donors form some of the 
largest special-interest groups in the state.135 The combined participation of high-
level politicians and major special interests in the behested payment process has 
led Common Cause to call it “the new fad in influence peddling.”136 
While Common Cause has expressed concern about all behested payments, 
Common Cause spokesperson Ung states that donations to charities run by a 
public official’s family member are especially concerning.137 SB 831 would have 
responded directly to that particular concern, prohibiting payments to those types 
of organizations.138 Still, SB 831 would have only expanded the definition of a 
 
125. Parkerperry, supra note 122. 
126. See Onishi, supra note 7 (describing recent bribery allegations against California politicians). 
127. McGreevy, supra note 12. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130.  SB 831 § 1(a), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted). 
131. UNG, supra note 32, at 13–14. 
132. Id. at 13. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. York, supra note 41. 
136. Id. 
137. Parkerperry, supra note 122. 
138. SB 831 § 1(a), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
381 
contribution to include those that confer a material financial benefit on a public 
official or are made to a nonprofit controlled by a public official or a member of 
his family, an expansion that would not address all of the concerns of Common 
Cause.139 
There are those, however, who support behested payments to nonprofit 
organizations.140 Dan Schnur, a former FPPC Chairman, emphasized the 
difficulty in legally separating legitimate philanthropic donations from those that 
are motivated by the potential for political gain.141 There is real concern that the 
proscription of such payments would create a chilling effect on charitable 
donations as a whole.142 
Because SB 831 would only have banned behested payments to 
organizations owned or controlled by elected officials and their families, groups 
like Brown’s schools would likely fall outside of the legislation’s purview.143 
Still, the concern regarding potential improprieties stemming from these 
payments is clearly reflected in SB 831.144 The bill would have defined an 
organization as “owned or controlled” by a person if that person “is a director, 
officer, partner, or trustee of, or holds any position of management with, the 
nonprofit organization, and is paid for his or her services.”145 While Brown 
founded the schools when he was the mayor of Oakland, his only role with them 
now is as a fundraiser and supporter.146 Even Ung admits that Brown “has no day-
to-day management of the schools.”147 As a result, the new legislation would have 
left the payments to Brown’s schools unaffected.148 
Despite concern about the motives behind these gifts from groups like 
Common Cause,149 there is a countervailing interest in avoiding discouraging 
charitable donations as well.150 In the case of Brown in particular, the governor 
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has defended his fundraising efforts with the schools, calling it “the Lord’s work” 
and dismissing the scrutiny applied to the donations in question as “journalistic 
games.”151 
Senate Bill 831 would have avoided discouraging charitable donations of this 
kind due to a stipulation that would have limited the restrictions on behested 
payments to 501(c)(4) groups.152 The stipulation thus would have exempted all 
charities and schools from its new regulations, subjecting only a single, narrower 
class of nonprofit organization to increased scrutiny.153 501(c)(4) groups include 
“social welfare” groups and include organizations such as civic leagues, that are 
allowed to participate in the political arena through financial contributions in 
order to pursue their respective agendas.154 
By failing to include 501(c)(3) organizations under the purview of the bill, 
legislators would have excluded all organizations acting “exclusively for 
religious, charitable, and educational purposes.”155 These groups include schools 
and charities, including Brown’s charter schools and the organization set up by 
Tom Calderon.156 However, while this stipulation would have significantly 
limited the scope and effectiveness of SB 831, it is often necessary to amend 
legislation and compromise in order to get legislation passed.157 
Despite the limited scope of the new restrictions, SB 831 would have 
prohibited the type of payment that Common Cause indicated was of the gravest 
concern: those payments made to nonprofit organizations owned or controlled by 
public officials and their families.158 Supporters of the legislation contend that 
taken as a whole, SB 831 would have “improve[d] and modernize[d] California’s 
Political Reform Act,”159 and struck a balance between limiting behested 
payments to groups owned or controlled by elected officials and their families 
while continuing to allow genuine charitable donations.160 
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C. Campaign Fund Expenditures 
The new restrictions SB 831 would have implemented on campaign fund 
expenditures161 could hardly be described as controversial.162 The treatment 
commentators afforded to these provisions of SB 831 can charitably be described 
as cursory.163 New rules that would have forbidden the use of campaign funds on 
items including vehicles, real property, clothing, tuition, and country club dues 
form the bulk of SB 831’s campaign fund expenditure provisions.164 None of 
these, however, are the subject of the bulk of the discussion of SB 831’s 
campaign fund expenditure restrictions.165 Instead, the main topic of conversation 
when it comes to the campaign fund expenditure side of SB 831 revolves around 
a provision that was removed from the final version of the bill: a new restriction 
that would have forbidden the use of campaign funds for the legal defense of 
indicted legislators.166 
SB 831 and other ethics bills drafted around the same time were preceded by 
the indictment of three California Legislators early in 2014.167 The provision to 
stop indicted lawmakers from using their campaign funds to subsidize their legal 
defense was removed “at the request of Senate leaders.”168 However, the sponsor 
of SB 831, Senator Hill, has indicated that he is unaware of the reasons behind 
the alteration.169 While the changes SB 831 would have implemented are 
significant, they may not fully realize the vision of the lawmakers who sought 
this legislation in the aftermath of stunning scandal.170 Those who see the changes 
that would have been implemented by SB 831 as underwhelming suggest that as 
the embarrassment of the scandal has faded, the motivation to accomplish real 
reform has faded with it.171 Dan Schnur, former FPPC Chair, put it this way: “[a]s 
soon as the headlines faded, so did the interest in the Capitol for any meaningful 
effort to clean up the system.”172 The implicit suggestion is that the motive for SB 
831 and other political reform bills was to avoid embarrassment in the wake of 
the senatorial indictments rather than to implement lasting reforms.173 Defenders 
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of the amendments made to the legislation have characterized them as necessary 
changes for the passage of the bill.174 Despite this characterization, the sentiment 
that it represents a “watered-down” attempt at political reform may stem at least 
in part from the fact that such an emblematic provision was removed from SB 
831.175 An amendment so favorable to indicted Senators to legislation created in 
response to the indictment of Senators could feel counter-intuitive.176 After all, 
the amendment would ensure that these Senators would not be forbidden from 
using their campaign war chests to fund their legal defense.177  
Still, the fact remains that the new rules that would have been implemented 
by SB 831 represent the next step in pursuing the goals espoused by the PRA.178 
While Schnur and others may feel let down by the final result, the legislation has 
been endorsed by Common Cause, a watchdog organization.179 While what SB 
831 failed to include has garnered criticism, what it did include would have 
“help[ed] improve and modernize the Political Reform Act of 1974.”180 
D. The Anatomy of a Veto: Brown’s Refusal to Sign SB 831 
Governor Brown vetoed SB 831 despite the legislature’s overwhelming 
support.181 He explained his decision to veto the bill as a way to block additional 
complicated regulatory requirements.182 Governor Brown further stated that the 
areas covered by SB 831 were already subject to extensive regulation that, 
presumably in his view, was sufficient.183 
Common Cause executive director Kathay Feng expressed disappointment 
that SB 831, along with other ethics bills passed by the Legislature, were vetoed 
by Brown.184 She indicated that Governor Brown’s vetoes came as a surprise to 
 
174. Id. 
175. See Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards, supra note 104 (describing the bill as “watered-down”); 
Calefati, supra note 9 (noting a decline in support for the bill as the embarrassment of the scandals fades). 
176. See id. (noting that the provision’s removal was requested by senate leaders). 
177. See id. (discussing the removal of the provision regarding the use of campaign funds for legal 
defense purposes). 
178. See id. (indicating that SB 831seeks to “improve and modernize” the PRA). 
179. Leila Pedersen, Defending Democracy and Delivering Disclosure, COMMON CAUSE, July 2, 2014, 
http://www.commoncause.org/states/California/news/defending-democracy-and.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
180. Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards, supra note 104. 
181. SB 831 Senate Bill–History, OFFICIAL CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, Nov. 29, 2014, 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0801-0850/sb_831_bill_20140930_history.html (on file with 
the McGeorge Law Review). 
182. Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Governor of California, to the Members of the California State 
Senate (Sept. 30, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/ 
SB_831_Veto_Message.pdf [hereinafter Veto Letter]. 
183. Id. 
184. David Siders, Jerry Brown Vetoes California Political Ethics Bills, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 30, 
2014, http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article2616394.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46 
385 
the organization “just in terms of restoring public confidence and creating the 
optics that our state government cares about ethics and takes it seriously.”185 
Despite Feng’s concerns about the perception created by the veto, the 
effectiveness of the proposed legislation was questioned by political ethics expert 
Jessica Levinson, who indicated that the bill would fail to “change the way 
business is done in Sacramento.”186 Governor Brown’s reasoning reflects the 
same line of thought; his veto message indicated that he refused to sign the bill 
because he felt it would not meaningfully “reduc[e] undue influence.”187 
Governor Brown’s suggestion that SB 831’s impact would have been less 
than meaningful may stem from the sense that the bill was diluted during its 
legislative journey.188 Between curtailing the impact of the restrictions on 
behested payments to 501(c)(4) groups,189 eliminating caps on gifts of travel,190 
and excising provisions like the one restricting politicians from using their 
campaign funds for legal defense,191 Governor Brown had a litany of examples to 
point to justify his assertion that the bill would fail to effectively eliminate 
improper influence.192 One state official noted that bills like these are often made 
as a response to a public relations disaster like the Senatorial indictments rather 
than for legitimate policy reasons; Governor Brown’s veto makes more sense in 
light of sentiments like that one.193 
V. CONCLUSION 
Governor Brown is foremost among those who have criticized SB 831.194 The 
bill’s amendments have led some to suggest that it is a product of waning 
ambition and desire.195 This ambition that led to the bill’s drafting has faded along 
with the embarrassment of the scandal that gave birth to it.196 However, criticisms 
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have been impactful on some level.197 The bill would have addressed concerns 
regarding lax disclosure requirements surrounding gifts of travel—a concern 
which has been echoed by one of the original drafters of the PRA.198 Additionally, 
SB 831 would have addressed payments to nonprofits owned or operated by 
elected officials and their family members, like those made to the organization 
operated by Senator Calderon’s brother.199  
The legislation was intended to “improve and modernize” the PRA, and 
according to its sponsor, it would have done so.200 Indeed, Common Cause, a 
watchdog organization that prides itself on advocating for this sort of change, 
endorsed the bill.201 “Sometimes it takes a crisis,” Senator Steinberg said, and 
what began with significant embarrassment for California’s democratic process 
resulted in an attempt by the legislature to strengthen that democratic process.202 
SB 831 would have represented a compromise, to be sure, but its veto nullifies 
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